Monday, September 17, 2012

WINE 2012 accepted papers

The list of papers accepted to appear at WINE 2012 is below, also on the WINE 2012 web site.

Regular papers

Vasileios Tzoumas, Christos Amanatidis and Evangelos Markakis.
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social Networks

Yoram Bachrach, Ian Kash and Nisarg Shah.
Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games

Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Mitzenmacher and Georgios Zervas.
An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported Services

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger.
Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits

Edward Lui and Samantha Leung.
Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Truthfulness

Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel and David Lee.
Biased Assimilation, Homophily, and the Dynamics of Polarization

Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà and Guido Proietti.
Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games

Nikolay Archak, Vahab Mirrokni and S Muthukrishnan.
Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover Effects

Sunil Easaw Simon and Krzysztof Apt.
Choosing Products in Social Networks

Morteza Zadimoghaddam and Aaron Roth.
Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference

Amotz Bar-Noy, Yi Gai, Matthew P. Johnson, Bhaskar Krishnamachari and George Rabanca.
Funding Games: the Truth but not the Whole Truth

Pascal Lenzner.
Greedy Selfish Network Creation

Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer and Gerhard J. Woeginger.
Group Activity Selection Problem

Avishay Maya and Noam Nisan.
Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting

Georgios Piliouras, Tomas Valla and Laszlo Vegh.
LP-based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna.
Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse Seller

Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Narahari Yadati and James Zou.
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing

Bundit Laekhanukit, Guyslain Naves and Adrian Vetta.
Non-Redistributive Second Welfare Theorems

Nicole Immorlica and Emmanouil Pountourakis.
On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tenneholtz.
On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality

Dimitris Fotakis and Paris Siminelakis.
On the Efficiency of Influence-and-Exploit Strategies for Revenue Maximization under Positive Externalities

Volodymyr Kuleshov and Gordon Wilfong.
On the efficiency of the simplest pricing mechanisms in two-sided markets

Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos.
Optimal Pricing is Hard

Pranav Dandekar, Nadia Fawaz and Stratis Ioannidis.
Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems

Victor Naroditskiy, Mingyu Guo, Lachlan Dufton, Maria Polukarov and Nicholas R. Jennings.
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems

Kshipra Bhawalkar and Tim Roughgarden.
Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions

Johanne Cohen, Christoph Dürr and Kim Thang Nguyen.
Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik.
Social Context in Potential Games

Katrina Ligett and Aaron Roth.
Take it or Leave it: Running a Survey when Privacy Comes at a Cost

Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour and Noam Nisan.
The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization

Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Stefano Leucci and Guido Proietti.
The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General Host Graphs

Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Sanjeev Khanna and Brendan Lucier.
The Power of Local Information in Social Networks

Xujin Chen, Benjamin Doerr, Xiaodong Hu, Weidong Ma, Rob van Stee and Carola Winzen.
The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

Ashish Goel and David Lee.
Triadic Consensus: A Randomized Algorithm for Voting in a Crowd

Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy.
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-dimensional Covering Problems

Hamed Amini and Nikolaos Fountoulakis.
What I tell you three times is true: bootstrap percolation in small worlds

Short papers

Anand Bhalgat and Sreenivas Gollapudi.
Ad Allocation for Browse Sessions

Lirong Xia.
Generalized Weighted Model Counting: An Efficient Monte-Carlo Meta-Algorithm

Sayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk and Vincent Conitzer.
Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network

Lei Yao, Wei Chen and Tie-Yan Liu.
Convergence Analysis for Weighted Joint Strategy Fictitious Play in Generalized Second Price Auction

Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir.
Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects

Swapnil Dhamal and Narahari Yadati.
Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies

Bassel Tarbush and Alexander Teytelboym.
Homophily in online social networks

Piotr Krysta and Orestis Telelis.
Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization

Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Omer Tamuz.
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions

Vahab Mirrokni, Mukund Sundurarajan and Sebastien Roch.
On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities

Daniela Saban and Nicolas Stier-Moses.
The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Connections to the 1-median Problem

Angelo Fanelli, Dariusz Leniowski, Gianpiero Monaco and Piotr Sankowski.
The ring design game with fair cost allocation

Amos Fiat and Ariel Levavi.
Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

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