Monday, October 29, 2012

AGT/COMSOC program in Singapore

This winter, Institute for Mathematical Sciences (Singapore) will host a 2-month long program on algorithmic game theory and computational social choice, organized by Ning Chen (NTU) and Edith Elkind (NTU). The program includes three workshops - a mini-workshop on mechanism design (Jan 10-11), a week-long workshop on algorithmic game theory (Jan 14-18), and a week-long workshop on computational social choice (Jan 20-25) - as well as longer stays by some of the invited researchers.  A graduate winter school will be run in parallel with the workshops. Confirmed speakers include Rakesh Vohra, Tim Roughgarden, Jason Hartline, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang and Jean-Francois Laslier; see
for the complete list.

The workshops are open to participation. There is no registration fee, but the prospective visitors are asked to fill out the registration form at and drop an e-mail to Edith and Ning (eelkind, ningc at Thanks to generous support from the IMS and the AI Journal, we will be able to provide financial support (accommodation and/or travel) to a limited number of graduate students and young scientists who wish to attend the winter school; the applications for financial support can be filled out at

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

RA positions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design at the Universities of Liverpool and Glasgow

This article by the BBC’s economics editor celebrates the award of the Nobel Prize for economics to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley. See also this article by The Guardian’s economics editor.

A forthcoming research project at the Universities of Liverpool and Glasgow addresses topics that are highly related to those that led to the above prize. Below is a copy of the ad that went to various mailing lists.



Start date: 1 February 2013 or shortly thereafter
Post duration: 36 months
Salary: 31,948 - 35,938 pounds per annum

Ref.: R-580873 (Liverpool), 002834 (Glasgow)

We are seeking two Research Associates to be employed for 3 years on an EPSRC-funded research project entitled “Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfer”.

The aim of this project is to find new approximate and optimal, truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, matching problems with preferences and facility location problems, in each case in the absence of monetary transfer. This will involve theoretical research, to include the design and analysis of new algorithms, and also practical implementation and experimental evaluation of these algorithms.

This is a multi-site research project which involves the Universities of Liverpool and Glasgow (EPSRC grant refs EP/K01000X/1 and EP/K010042/1).

One Research Associate will be based at the University of Liverpool and will be supervised by Dr Piotr Krysta. The other will be based at the University of Glasgow and will be supervised by Dr David Manlove. Other members of the project team include Prof Paul Goldberg and Dr Giorgos Christodoulou (co-investigators, based at the University of Liverpool), and identified overseas researchers.

Applicants should have a good first degree in Computing Science or a related discipline, a PhD in the area of Algorithms and Complexity, and typically two years of postdoctoral experience in this area, or equivalent research / industrial experience.

Research experience in one or more of the following areas is desirable:
- algorithmic mechanism design
- combinatorial optimisation
- approximation algorithms
- matching problems with preferences

Applications for each post should be directed to the University of Liverpool or Glasgow as appropriate. Applicants are welcome to apply for both positions.

For further details of the Liverpool post, see Informal enquiries may be made to Dr Piotr Krysta (email: To apply, visit

For further details of the Glasgow post, see Informal enquiries may be made to Dr David Manlove (email To apply, visit

The closing date for both posts is 12 November 2012.